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EVIDENCE
THEODORE KLEIN*
This article is a Survey of Florida court decisions during a recent
two-year period concerning problems in evidence. It is a continuation of
previous articles and it covers selected decisions from 132 So.2d 460 to
159 So.2d 641, inclusive. For presentation purposes, the subject matter
covered by this Survey will be presented by topic, rather than chrono-
logically.
EXAMINATION
Applying the standard rule with regard to timeliness of objection
in Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Ellis,' the court refused to review the
question of admissibility of testimony of a witness on the grounds that
after objections to questions put to the witness were sustained, no proffer
of his testimony was made to the trial court. Consequently, nothing ap-
peared in the record which could be the basis for review. Similarly, no
review of allegedly prejudicial remarks by the trial court could be had
for the reason that no timely objection had been made to the remarks
at the time of trial.'
If an objection which is made to a particular line of testimony is
overruled, repeated objections to questions involving the same area and
subject are not necessary and failure to make them is not an implied
consent to the admission of such testimony.3
In Owca v. Zemzichi,4 a failure to object to testimony on the subject
of future employment, such subject being an item of special damages not
contained in the plaintiff's complaint, nevertheless precluded the defen-
dant from objecting to an instruction on -the subject. The defendant's
failure to object to the testimony constituted a waiver on his part, and
the issue was tried by implied consent under Rule 1.15 of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure. Although an amendment to the pleadings had
been ordered by the court, thereby fortifying its position, the court never-
theless indicated:
amendment of pleadings is not necessarily considered impera-
tive where no objection has been made that the evidence is not
within the scope of the pleadings in a case which is tried as if
the issue had been raised. 5
* Member of Florida Bar and past Associate Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. 143 So.2d 550 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
2. Collins v. Farley, 147 So.2d 593. (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
3. McCullers v. State, 143 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
4. 137 So.2d 876 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
5. Id. at 879.
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However, the mere fact that an otherwise inadmissible matter enters
the judicial arena does not automatically constitute a waiver of the sort
mentioned, nor endogenously allow it to be tried by implied consent. Thus,
where the subject of insurance was inadvertently mentioned, it did not
"open the door" for opposing counsel to show that there had been an
insurance recovery.6
Viewing the same problem from a different perspective, in an action
for wrongful death, testimony solicited by counsel that the defendant had
previously killed a man was unintentionally admitted.' When the defen-
dant then introduced the fact that he had been acquitted for the prior
killing, he neither lost nor waived the benefit of his objection since he
was merely trying to minimize the harmful effect of the improper
testimony.
Several problems have arisen which involved comments to the effect
that the defendant in a criminal trial did not testify in his own behalf.
In Peel v. State8 the prosecuting attorney in his closing argument stated
that when the defendant was asked certain questions on the stand, he
"took the Fifth." On appeal, it was determined that the defendant had
not "taken the Fifth Amendment." The appellate court held that state-
ments made in such a manner would be a comment on the evidence, and
furthermore pointed out defendant's failure to comply with section
918.10(4) of the Florida Statutes, which provides that in order to appeal
upon the refusal to give an instruction, a specific timely objection is neces-
sary. Another situation in which defendant was held to waive his right to
object to the prosecution attorney's comment that defendant had failed
to take the stand presented itself identically in two separate cases. In
both instances the defendant's counsel had first made it very clear to
the jury that the defendant had not testified in his own behalf. In this
light, affirmation thereof by the state's attorney did not constitute re-
versible error.
REFRESHING THE MEMORY
In Minturn v. State, ° it was held to be prejudicial error to allow a
witness for the state to use a notebook to refresh his independent memory
without requiring that the notebook be made available to the defense
during cross-examination. The court stated that to hold otherwise would
circumvent the right of the defendant to a fair cross-examination; in
addition, it labeled the right to examine the notebook as one stemming
from the constitutional guaranty that the accused be confronted by his
accusers.
6. Seminole Shell Co. v. Clearwater Flying Co., 156 So.2d 543 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
7. Carbone v. Coblentz, 132 So.2d 629 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
8. 154 So.2d 910 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
9. Nations v. State, 145 So.2d 259 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962), and Pinkney v. State, 142
So.2d 144 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
10. 136 So.2d 359 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
EVIDENCE
FIRST HAND KNOWLEDGE
In a prosecution for performing acts with the intent to procure a
miscarriage,1 the state introduced testimony of a doctor relating to the
analysis of a tissue specimen taken from the prosecuting witness. The
defendant contended that the state's evidence did not establish an un-
broken chain of possession from the time of taking the specimen until
analysis. The court held that continuity of possession was sufficiently
established by showing that the specimen was taken by a witness and
came into the hands of the doctor who analyzed it and testified as to
the results through customary hospital procedure. It was not necessary
that every person who handled the specimen be put on the stand to estab-
lish the chain; it sufficed to show that the tissue was taken, properly
identified, and reached the laboratory through normal hospital practice.
OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
Most of the problems in this area concerned the weight to be given
to expert testimony. The difficulties arose in deciding whether an "expert"
was truly an "expert," and if so, whether the area covered by his testi-
mony was expertise subject matter. In addition a number of problems
arose in which the expert's opinion was not, for one reason or another,
based upon first hand knowledge. The courts' solutions were as varied
as the situations with which they were presented.
In Home Ins. Co. v. Wiggins,'2 the court enunciated the general
proposition that the trial court can rule in its sound discretion on the
qualifications and range of subject matter on which an expert may be
questioned; here when the deposition of an expert as to the cause of
an accident was sought to be admitted,'" and there was no evidence which
indicated the length and quality of the deponent's experience, the trial
court could hold within its discretion that this particular witness did
not qualify as an expert. In State Road Dept. v. Outlaw, 4 the court
pragmatically stated that because of the fact that the condemning
authority would be placed at great expense if landowners were required
to get professional appraisers in each instance, the trial court had discre-
tion to allow a person to testify as an expert based on the facts adduced
in each case. Thus, qualifications other than being a professional ap-
praiser could constitute one as an expert, and even the testimony of
certain lay witnesses would be admissible.
The court passes on the competency of an expert, but the failure of
an otherwise competent expert to consider one of numerous factors in-
volved in assessing compensation goes neither to his competency, nor the
11. Urga v. State, 155 So.2d 719 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
12. 147 So.2d 157 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
13. Seminole Shell Co. v. Clearwater Flying Co., supra note 6.
14. 148 So2d 741 (Fla. lst Dist. 1963).
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competency of his testimony, but only 'to the weight to be given his
opinion. This problem arose in State Road Dept. v. Falcon'5 in which
the state's experts, in making a valuation in a condemnation proceeding,
did not take into account one particular transaction, an omission which
was subsequently brought out by the defendant's experts. The court
held that this failure by the state's witnesses could not render them in-
competent, and the trial court's granting of a new trial on that basis was
reversible error in that -the remission of the state's experts was only
arguable to the jury.
In Schnedl v. Rich,'" the plaintiff sought to introduce an expert to
interpret tax returns. The court then agreed with counsel that an expert
was not needed in that the returns are presumably within the compre-
hension of the ordinary juror. Thus, no error was committed by excluding
testimony on the matter by the expert. But in a personal injury action1 7
the jury was held to be free to reject expert testimony and rely on contra-
dictory lay evidence, even though the facts testified to by a physician
concerning a whiplash injury were not within the ordinary experience of
the jury. And in the same vein, in Norman v. State,'8 the defendant's
sanity was in issue. The court held that the jury could consider both
testimony of psychiatrists and lay witnesses who observed the accused
during his alleged insanity.
Two interesting decisions which were seemingly contradictory con-
cerned the admissibility and weight of a psychiatrist's opinion as to the
defendant's sanity at the time the crime was committed. In McCullers v.
State,") the testimony of the doctor was based in substantial part upon
hearsay concerning the defendant's actions at the time of the crime. The
court, in excluding the testimony, stated that it could not be known
how much of his testimony was valid because of the impossibility of
determining the credibility of the statements upon which the expert relied
for his opinion. It was also impossible to say that the jury did not rely
heavily upon this expert. The same question arose in Land v. State,2"
but in this instance the expert's testimony was permitted to go to the
jury. The apparent inconsistency was reconciled in the following statement:
Clearly, an opinion based upon long and painstaking study of
the subject and personal knowledge of his history is worthy of
great credence, while an opinion, based solely upon information
offered by third persons, would be of little or no value and not
admissible. But an opinion, founded upon the expert's scientific
examination of the subject and conversations with third persons,
15. 157 So.2d 563 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
16. 137 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
17. Shaw v. Puleo, 159 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1964).
18. 156 So.2d 186 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
19. 143 So.2d 909 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
20. 156 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1963).
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would not be inadmissible, absent a showing that his conclusion
was based in major or substantial part upon such conversations.
In the McCullers case, supra, the expert testimony was based
almost entirely upon conversations with third persons not before
the court while, in this case, such conversations appear to have
been incidental and of little or no influence. To restrict the scope
of the examination to the subject alone would often preclude the
expert's consideration of pertinent data. However, the extent to
which he relied on information obtained other than through
first-hand observation, as disclosed by direct and cross exami-
nation, is an element to be considered by the jury as it assesses
the credibility of the report.21
In Urga v. State,2" a doctor's opinion based on hearsay that an
abortion had been attempted was inadmissible, but is was harmless error
when the trial court permitted his opinion into evidence because it was
cumulative of what had already been said, and standing alone, was not
essential for conviction.
In one ostensibly anomalous situation, the jury was, in effect, not
permitted to reject the testimony of expert witnesses. In Dade County v.
Renedo,8 a condemnation case in which there was conflicting evidence
as to value, the jury was permitted to resolve the conflict, but only within
the bounds of the evidence. Thus, when the experts' value estimates were
not, either by themselves or in relation to any other evidence, susceptible
of different interpretations, the amount of the jury verdict had to lie
somewhere between the lowest and highest estimate of value. The jury
was permitted to view the property, but was not permitted to utilize the
knowledge gained by the view to arrive at an independent determination
as to value. The view was used only to assist in interpreting the evidence.
A hypothetical question containing assumptions of fact must be
based on facts established by competent, substantial evidence. Thus,
when the answer to such a question containing unsupported assumptions
was itself the only evidence of causal connection between a collision and
certain female disorders, the hypothetical question was held to be im-
proper.24 Similarly, in Monsalvatge & Co. of Miami, Inc. v. Ryder
Leasing, Inc.,25 an expert witness had to assume from the hypothetical
question posed to him that a certain number of hours had been spent
in a case for the purpose of awarding an attorney's fee. In fact, no such
testimony had been offered to the jury. The estimate of fees was held to
be without evidential value, for a conclusion by an expert not supported
by the evidence cannot constitute proof of existence of facts necessary
21. Id. at 11.
22. 155 So.2d 719 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
23. 147 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1962).
24. Young v. Pyle, 145 So.2d 503 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
25. 151 So.2d 453 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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to support the opinion. In addition, an answer of an expert to a hypothet-
ical question must be given on the basis of facts stated in the question,
and without recourse to other facts within the expert's own knowledge.
Thus in Sheehan v. Frith,26 hypothetical questions prefaced by the phrase
"all things being equal" would require or permit the witness to draw
conclusions of fact from the evidence or allow him to exercise his own
judgment, neither of which would be permissible. In Carlton v. Bielling,27
a hypothetical question was posed to an expert which sought to elicit
his opinion as to the validity of opinions expressed by the opponent's
experts. The court held that testimony of experts given in answer to
hypothetical' questions which incorporate opinions, inferences, and conclu-
sions of others is improper. However, when the expert did not express his
opinion as to the validity of the opposing experts' testimony as he was
asked, but instead gave a contrary opinion based on the evidence adduced,
with appropriate reasons, the error was harmless. In Pinkney v. State,28
a physician who examined two bodies to determine the time of death
believed, when he examined them, that one had been embalmed. This
was not the case; nevertheless, the validity of his opinion was not de-
stroyed, since it was based on later-adduced testimony which was to
the effect that no embalming had taken place before the time of his
examination.
Testimony of a doctor was sought to be admitted to the effect that
a party's faculties would have been impaired to the extent of 25% as a
result of the ingestion of an admitted quantity of alcohol." The court
held that the testimony would be so equivocal, uncertain, and indefinite as
to have no probative value. In Casey v. Florida Power Corp.,0 the peti-
tioner sought an easement for a right of way for power lines across a
landowner's property by way of condemnation. The respondent land-
owner sought to introduce evidence that the fair market value of the
property would be lowered by virtue of the fact that a prospective pur-
chaser would be afraid of the steel towers and power lines located on
the land. The court excluded this opinion testimony on the ground that
it was too speculative and conjectural, stating that the line must be
drawn when a jury must base its award upon ignorance and fear.
IMPEACHMENT
In Minturn v. State,81 a witness for the state used a notebook to re-
fresh his memory. The court held that the defense had the right to
26. 138 So.2d 76 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
27. 146 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
28. 142 So.2d 144 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
29. Whitten v. Erny, 152 So.2d 510 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
30. 157 So.2d 168 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
31. 136 So.2d 359 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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examine the notes so as to be in a position to impeach the witness on
cross-examination. Section 90.10 of the Florida Statutes requires a predi-
cate to be laid before a witness may be impeached. Thus, in Hancock v.
McDonald"2 the trial court erred in not requiring a foundation to be
laid-first, by calling to the witness' attention the alleged contradictory
statement, and then, by giving him an opportunity to explain the in-
consistency.
A trial court cannot properly conclude that the income tax returns
of a taxicab driver are unreliable indications of his true income for the
reason that a large portion of his income consisted of gratuities.3" The
court could not presume that he would fail to report such gratuities as in-
come, and thus, his tax returns were admissible as impeachment evidence
on his claimed loss of earnings. In Corbett v. Berg,34 an action to recover
for personal injuries, the defendant asked the plaintiff if he had ever filed
a workmen's compensation claim. When he received a negative reply,
the defendant sought to introduce an Industrial Commission index card
containing information pertaining to a workmen's compensation claim
which had been made by plaintiff in the past. In addition to its use in
refuting plaintiff's statement that his injury resulted solely from the
mishap upon which this suit was based, the index card could properly
be used to impeach the plaintiff's testimony. In Finley P. Smith, Inc. v.
Schectman,3 the defendant introduced testimony to the effect that the
plaintiff had not paid his hospital bill as he contended, but rather, his
insurance carrier had paid the bill. The court held that the fact that the
plaintiff had not personally paid the hospital bill could not be used to
reduce the plaintiff's damages. However, the matter was introduced by
defendant for impeachment purposes only, and thus, a court instruction
that the jury should not consider this factor in mitigation of damages
was sufficient to prevent a mistrial. The instruction was all that was re-
quired to restrict an otherwise improper scope of examination to a proper
impeachment objective.
In Goswich v. State, 6 in an attempt to impeach a witness for the
defense, the prosecuting attorney had elicited from the witness the fact
that he previously had invoked his constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination at the time he was subpoenaed before the state's attorney.
The court, in holding that this type of impeachment was proper, pointed
out that cases involving the constitutional right of a party-defendant were
32. 148 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
33. Collins v. Farley, 137 So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), affirmed by the same court in
Sheldon v. Tiernan, 147 So.2d 593 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962), after being reversed on other
grounds in Farley v. Collins, 146 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1962).
34. 152 So.2d 196 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
35. 132 So.2d 460 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
36. 137 So.2d 863 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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not controlling, and further restricted the issue by virtue of the fact
that the witness here involved voluntarily had taken the stand. In arriving
at the decision, it was first stated that the policy of the courts was "to
allow great latitude in the cross-examination of a witness as to matters
affecting his credibility. 31 7 This was held to be especially cogent when
the cross-examination dealt with the motive or intent of the witness as
directed to a party. Basing its ultimate decision on public policy, the
court opined:
Perhaps it would be better if no mention were ever made of the
fact that one person has exercised a constitutional right and that
another has not. Then the persons wishing to exercise the right
could not be criticised or censored by anyone. But such freedom
from criticism does not exist in the exercise of any right.
All courts are daily concerned with the rights of the individual.
No single right can be unreasonably extended at the expense of
others. The requirement of the public that truth be displayed
at criminal trials outweighs the right of a witness not to have it
known that he has used the Fifth Amendment as a reason for
failing to testify.8"
A witness cannot be cross-examined as to collateral or irrelevant
facts merely to discredit him by showing contradictions. Thus, in a
prosecution for performing acts with the intent to commit an abortion,"
inquiries concerning the former married life and divorce of the prosecut-
ing witness sought to establish whether she had been impregnated by a
man other than her husband, and therefore had testified falsely in her
divorce proceeding; as such, her alleged illicit conception could be classi-
fied only as prior misconduct, which is not reasonably relevant to the
instant case, and could not be made the basis of impeachment proof. The
impeaching evidence must be directed to credibility, rather than to former
misconduct of a different category. In Peel v. State,40 the defendant's
counsel tried to impeach the state's witness by showing (1) that the wit-
ness had been granted immunity, and (2) that he had been indicted for
another murder. On the matter of immunity, the defense could properly
suggest to the jury that the testimony of a witness so statured is entitled
to no weight and credibility. However, on the question of another crime,
the court held this to be a collateral matter solicited on cross-examination
which is not a proper method of impeachment. The court quoted from
Watson v. Campbell4 wherein the Supreme Court of Florida stated that
the general rule is that "evidence of particular acts of misconduct can-
not be introduced to impeach the credibility of a witness."
37. Id. at 867.
38. Id. at 867.
39. Urga v. State, 155 So.2d 719 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
40. 154 So.2d 910 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
41. 55 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1951).
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COMPETENCY
In Whitten v. Erny42 it was stated that the question of competency
of an expert is for the trial judge to decide; as previously noted,43 the
failure of an otherwise competent expert to consider one of numerous
factors involved in assessing compensation goes not to his competency,
but only to the weight to be given his testimony. The trial court in its
sound discretion rules on the qualifications of the expert and determines
the range of subjects on which he may be questioned." In Seminole Shell
Co. v. Clearwater Flying Co." the deposition of an expert which con-
tained his opinion of the cause of an accident was sought to be admitted.
Since the deposition was void of any evidence which showed the length
and quality of the defendant's experience, the trial court within its dis-
cretion could properly hold that the witness was not competent to testify
in the matter.
In Porter v. State"' the defendant's common-law wife was permitted
to testify against him. There was no error, since Section 90.04 of the
Florida Statutes, which allows a wife to testify against her husband, ab-
rogated the common-law rule that forbade either husband or wife from
testifying against the other. The court overruled the defendant's conten-
tion that the statute was limited in its scope to situations in which the
wife was an interested party.
In an action for negligence, the plaintiff took the deposition of the
defendant's store manager.47 In the course of the deposition, the plaintiff
sought to elicit the contents of a conversation which the deponent had
with another employee; the defendant objected, contending that it was
his work product and, therefore, was privileged. Since the store manager
did not mention more than the employee's name and address in his per-
sonal report, the conversation was in no way privileged as a work product,
and it was a proper matter for discovery.
An attorney has an obligation not to divulge information given to
him in confidence by his client, and any unauthorized disclosure by him
is a violation of his oath as an attorney. Thus, in Cayson v. State," an
attorney defended a client charged with murder. Later the client con-
tended that the murder had been confessed to his attorney by one of
his previous clients. The defendant contended the former representation
by the attorney was an inconsistent position with regard to the defendant.
The court, in holding the attorney-client privilege paramount, opined
42. 152 So.2d 510 -(Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
43. State Road Dept. v. Falcon, 157 So.2d 563 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963); see text accompany-
ing note 15 supra.
44. Home Ins. Co. v. Wiggins, 147 So.2d 157 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962),.
45. 156 So.2d 543 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
46. 160 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1964).
47. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Belcher, 144 So.2d 863 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
48. 139 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
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that not only was there no inconsistency in representing both clients, but
the knowledge which the attorney allegedly possessed may have even
aided the attorney in defending the second client. The court further
stated that had the attorney been called as a witness, he could not have
been compelled to testify to the identity of the former client or to any
information divulged to him in his capacity as an attorney, absent a
waiver of the privilege by the client.
RELEVANCY
Before a court can rule on the relevancy of evidence to the issue at
hand, it must first be determined that the evidence has some bearing on
a material issue. Thus, in an action to revoke a medical license from a
doctor who was accused of performing an abortion, a question to the
prosecuting witness asking her to name the man she blamed for her
pregnant condition was improper on the ground that pregnancy was not
material to the crime of abortion.49 In Bowden v. State5" the complaining
witness in a prosecution for incest named her father, the defendant, as
the father of her child. The defendant's motion for blood grouping tests
for impeachment purposes to show non-paternity was overruled on the
basis that parentage is not material and not a determinative issue in
incest. The court also found that additional testimony existed which
supported a finding by the jury of incest.
Aside from evidence of other crimes the cases in which the problem
of relevancy was dealt with did not fit into any pattern, but rather fell
into haphazard niches as to when certain testimony was relevant to the
issues at hand and when it was not. In pursuit of justice the trial judge
could elicit testimony which he deemed proper to acquaint the jury with
the facts needed to intelligently resolve issues, and could make inquiries
to obtain truth.51
In Pauline v. Lee," a hearing to revoke a liquor license, there was
testimony that the defendant's employees had solicited for prostitution.
Although there was no proof that this was ever done in the presence of
the defendant, it was so recurrent as to permit an inference of condona-
tion on the part of the defendant.
In Casey v. Florida Power Corp."8 the landowner in a condemnation
suit sought to introduce testimony concerning the characteristics of the
power line which was to run across his land. Since the defendant failed
to show anything which relevantly connected this type of line with land
values, the trial court was correct in rejecting the testimony.
49. Grimes v. Kennedy, 152 So.2d 509 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
50. 137 So.2d 621 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
51. Crews v. Warren, 157 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
52. 147 So.2d 359 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
53. 157 So.2d 168 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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The problem of corroboration of testimony was touched upon in
two cases. In Cayson v. State54 the defendant desired to put a witness on
the stand who allegedly had heard a confession that someone other than
the defendant had committed the crime for which the defendant was now
on trial. The court stated that the uncorroborated testimony of a witness
that some unnamed third party confessed on some indefinite date that he
had committed the crime was not entitled to credence.
In an action for negligence the defendant claimed that the collision
was an unavoidable accident because her brakes suddenly failed. 5  She
introduced testimony to show that her brakes had been checked regularly
and operated perfectly up to the time of the collision. Several weeks after
the accident, three experts examined the brake system of the automobile
and found an unusual rupture in the main hydraulic brake line, which
would not have been detectable from a visual outside inspection. The plain-
tiff contended that the experts' opinions were not entitled to credence, since
the lapse of time prior to their examination precluded any of their find-
ings from being relevant as to the condition of the brakes at the time of
the collision. The court, however, indicated the corroborating testimony
of a police officer to the effect that he found a puddle of brake fluid under
the automobile immediately following the accident, and in view of this
substantiating testimony, the lapse of time until the examination by the
experts did not render their testimony inadmissible, but it bore only on
the weight to be given to their testimony.
In Hardy v. Hayes Bock Roofing Co.,56 an action for personal
injuries, the plaintiff read the deposition of the defendant's physician
into evidence without including medical records attached to the deposi-
tion. When the defendant later offered these records into evidence, the
plaintiff objected. The court, in holding that the trial court properly
overruled the objection, distinguished the instant situation from two
cases relied on by the plaintiff. One involved "progress notes" rather than
hospital records. In the other, a portion of a deposition was read into
evidence, but the entire deposition was permitted to be taken into the
jury room. This was reversible error in that it allowed irrelevant mat-
ters to influence the jury. However, in the instant case, the evidence
offered by the defendant constituted a part of the hospital records,
contained no irrelevant information, and therefore, properly could be ad-
mitted into evidence. In Minturn v. State57 the state read a confession
in open court which alluded to previous crimes. A mistrial was granted
on the basis that the state has a duty to delete those portions of a con-
fession which are not relevant to the crime in question.
54. 139 So.2d 719 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1962).
55. Guelli v. Kraus, 145 So.2d 900 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
56. 152 So.2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
57. 136 So.2d 359 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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The Florida courts have taken a firm position with regard to the
admissibility of evidence of other crimes. Thus, in an action for wrongful
death, unsolicited testimony that the defendant previously had killed a
man was still too prejudicial-even after a court instruction." The de-
fendant attempted a rehabilitation by showing he had been acquitted for
the crime, but this did not constitute a waiver of objection to the prej-
udicial matter, and a mistrial was the only cure. In Licht v. State59 the
defendant was charged with receiving stolen property. A witness for
the state testified to the fact that he and the defendant had committed
petit larceny in a hardware store. The appellate court held this to be re-
versible error in that it was a wholly independent crime from the one for
which the defendant was on trial; since it was not introduced to show
motive, intent, absence or mistake or a common scheme, it was irrelevant
and inadmissible for the reason that it bore no relation to the crime
charged which would connect the two as parts of one transaction, and it
shed no light on the character of the crime charged.
In a prosecution for murder, in which the cause of death was poison-
ing by arsenic oxide, the state tried to show that the defendant's husband
and a friend of hers died of the same kind of poison ten years before.6°
The court stated that "the test of admissibility of similar fact evidence
is relevancy of the collateral crime to the crime charged or to the facts
out of which resulted the crime charged."'" It was further pointed out
that the previous crime was only admissible to cast light upon the
character of the act under investigation under one of the general excep-
tions, 2 in addition to which evidence was necessary to connect the de-
fendant with the collateral crime. Consequently, the evidence of the
previous deaths fell short on two grounds: With respect to the first,
there was a lack of proof of similarity in the manner of accomplishment
since all that was proved was that arsenic oxide was found in all of the
bodies. The court held that "these facts are inadequate to show a scheme,
plan or design in connection with the death of either decedent, much less
a common scheme, plan or design."6 To bolster its position, the court
also noted that the previous deaths were so remote in time as to render
them irrelevant to the instant case. The court's statement on the second
requirement for admissibility was in effect relegated to a position of mere
dicta in view of the holding on the first point, but the court quoted from
Wrather v. State6 4 with approval:
58. Carbone v. Coblentz, 132 So.2d 629 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
59. 148 So.2d 295 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
60. Norris v. State, 158 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
61. Id. at 804.
62. "Such evidence is admissible only if it casts light upon the character of the act
under investigation by showing motive, intent, absence of mistakes, common scheme,
identity, or a system of general pattern of criminality." Ibid.
63. Id. at 805.
64. 179 Tenn. 666, 669, 169 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tenn. 1943).
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Without going so far as to hold . . . that the proof of the in-
dependent crime must be "beyond a reasonable doubt," we
approve the rule that, to render evidence of an independent
crime admissible, the proof of its commission, and of the con-
nection of the accused on trial therewith, must be not "vague
and uncertain," but clear and convincing. Obviously, an ab-
solute essential is that (1) a former crime has been committed,
and (2) committed by the identical person on trial . . . and
this limitation upon admissibility applies equally to all the ex-
ceptions to the general rule excluding evidence of other crimes,
whether introduced to prove identity or for any other purpose.
The initial holding of the court was to the effect that the present
situation did not fall into one of the "exceptions to the general rule,"
but the court nevertheless stated the above to be the rule in Florida.
A further discussion ensued as to when such similar fact evidence would
be admissible under the rules of relevancy:
In a trial for an unpleasant crime, evidence must be excluded
which indicates that the prisoner is more likely than most men
to have committed it, but evidence must be admitted which
tends to show that no man but the prisoner, who is known to
have done these things before, could have committed it. There
is a point in the ascending scale of probability when it is so
near to certainty, that it is absurd to shy at the admission of
the prejudicial evidence. 5
In Homer v. State6 the defendant was charged with threatening the
state's witness to keep him from testifying against the defendant in a
pending trial for grand larceny. Evidence relating to the crime of grand
larceny, and to the pending proceeding was admissible under an excep-
tion to the general rule excluding other crime evidence, because it was
relevant to the issues of motive and intent, and it was necessary to give
a complete picture of the crime charged. In a prosecution for assault
with intent to procure a miscarriage, testimony of other like offenses
concerning the method employed to procure miscarriage was not admis-
sible to establish bad character; however, it was relevant to show the
general scheme and modus operandi of the defendant. 7
In Williams v. State8 evidence of another crime was admitted under
the exception which permits the showing of a system or general pattern
of criminality. However, the other crime testimony was so voluminous
that it transcended the bounds of relevancy, for it no longer became in-
dicative of the pattern involved. Many objects involved in the first
crime were introduced into evidence which had nothing to do with the
65. Comment, Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence, 46 HARV. L. REV. 954, 983-84.
66. 149 So.2d 863 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
67. Nations v. State, 145 So.2d 259 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
68. 143 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1962).
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crime charged. As a result, the collateral crime became a feature of the
trial instead of an incident and converted the development of facts into
an assault on the defendant's character. The rule excluding evidence of
other crimes applies equally to witnesses who are not parties. Thus, in
Peel v. State6" evidence that the witness had committed another crime
amounted to a specific act which was not admissible to reflect upon his
morals or character; nor may a particular act of misconduct be used to
impeach his credibility. This rule was again enunciated in Urga v. State70
wherein it was attempted to be shown that the prosecuting witness had
had an illicit conception and had given false testimony in a divorce pro-
ceeding. The court stated that proper impeachment must be directed to
credibility rather than misconduct of a different category. The prior
actions must be reasonably relevant and material to the pending charge
or they will be excluded from the evidence.
In a prosecution for rape, the defense rested on the fact of consent. 71
Consequently, even without an attack of the prosecuting witness' charac-
ter by the defendant, the state could introduce evidence of the general
reputation for chastity for the reason that it was relevant to a material
issue. In Norman v. State,72 the defendant was refused the right to intro-
duce evidence pertaining to his general reputation for non-violence,
which was the character trait involved in the crime with which he was
charged. The state conceded that the lower court erred in excluding the
testimony, but contended that the error was harmless because (1) the
defendant had admitted the acts of violence and (2) the defendant had
successfully presented other evidence to the same effect. The appellate
court disagreed, since two issues for the jury to consider were (1)
whether the defendant committed the acts while in a state of legal provo-
cation, and (2) whether the defendant at the time of the acts was legally
responsible for his acts. Under these conditions, it was impossible to say
that the relevant evidence improperly excluded was such that it might
not have influenced the jury to decide the other way upon either or both
of these issues.
In Finley P. Smith, Inc. v. Schectman,8 the defendant introduced
evidence that the plaintiff's hospital bill had been paid by an insurance
company, for the purpose of impeaching plaintiff's prior testimony. The
plaintiff's objection was overruled and he then said "It's all right with
me if you are going to inject insurance." The defendant then moved for
a mistrial on the basis of plaintiff's statement, which was denied by the
court. The court asked the defendant if he wanted an instruction to cure
the error, but he replied that he wanted nothing more said about the
69. 154 So.2d 910 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
70. 155 So.2d 719 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
71. Edmondson v. State, 146 So.2d 396 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
72. 156 So.2d 186 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
73. 132 So.2d 460 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
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matter. The lower court was held to be correct in refusing to declare a
mistrial, for although the plaintiff may have been wrong in making the
comment about insurance, it could not be said that there was not some
justification in replying to the defendant who raised the subject initially.
In an ostensibly contrary opinion, insurance coverage was inadvertently
mentioned by a witness in Seminole Shell Co. v. Clearwater Flying Co.74
Opposing counsel sought to capitalize upon this error by introducing
testimony as to whether there actually had been insurance compensation.
The trial court permitted the testimony on the basis that plaintiff had
"opened the door" even though insurance had no relevancy to any issue
being tried, and then the court of its own volition sought to correct the
error by an instruction to the jury. The appellate court indicated that
insurance coverage is admissible when it is relevant to an issue involved
in the case, such as ownership, but the mere mention of insurance by one
party does not occasion the admissibility of additional testimony on
the subject by the other. Nor was the court's instruction to the jury
sufficient to correct the error since the effect upon the minds of the jury
could not be neutralized so easily. The distinguishing factors in the two
cases were that in the Schectman case the subject of insurance came forth
through elicited testimony and therefore a reply to the matter was
deemed to be somewhat justified. More cogent than that point, however,
was the fact that in the Schectman case the subject was introduced for a
legitimate purpose, i.e., impeachment. The appellate court in the instant
case, held in effect, that the relevancy to a permissible aim outweighed
the prejudiciality of the matter.
A scientific experiment which is sought to be admitted must have a
relationship to a material issue. Thus, blood grouping tests to show non-
paternity were not admissible in a prosecution, for incest since parentage
was not a material nor a determinative issue in the case.75 In order for the
results of an experiment to be admissible, the conditions in the test must
be substantially similar to those at the time of the accident. The de-
termination of similarity rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Thus, in Morton v. Hardwick Stove Co.,76 conditions under which
a stove exploded were simulated in an experiment. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in setting aside a verdict for the plaintiff after
it had improperly admitted the test, since great dissimilarities in air pres-
sure in the experiment and under actual conditions were shown to exist.
BEST EVIDENCE
In Corbett v. Berg,77 an index card of the Industrial Commission
was admissible as a "public record," and therefore, a duly certified copy
74. 156 So.2d 543 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
75. Bowden v. State, 137 So.2d 621 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
76. 138 So.2d 807 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
77. 152 So.2d 196 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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in accordance with section 92.12 of the Florida Statutes was also ad-
missible.
HEARSAY
In Pauline v. Lee,78 an action to revoke a liquor license, witnesses
testified to the fact that the defendant's employees had solicited for
prostitution. The court held that such testimony was not hearsay for it
was not introduced to establish the truth of the statements attributed
to the declarants, but rather, the testimonies were verbal acts introduced
solely to establish the very fact of their utterance.
After the plaintiff was permitted -to read a deposition to the jury in
an action to recover for personal injuries, medical reports of the defen-
dant's doctor which were attached to a deposition were sought to be intro-
duced into evidence by the defendant.79 In holding the reports admissible,
the court distinguished a case involving a doctor's "progress notes" as
opposed to regular hospital records. The court further distinguished
the instant case from one in which a portion of a deposition was read
into evidence, and then, the entire deposition was taken into the jury
room. It was pointed out that:
such action was reversible error on the basis that it permitted
irrelevant, harmful and improper matters to influence the j'ury
and permitted them to have access to the written testimony of
a witness who had not appeared and given his testimony orally
before the court, thereby placing testimony offered by deposi-
tion in a higher category than that offered in person by a wit-
ness before the court.80
In Cayson v. State"' the defendant sought to have his attorney called
as a witness. He contended that the crime for which he was on trial had
been confessed to the attorney by a previous client. The court refused
to allow him to testify for several reasons, but it stated that even if he
were allowed to take the stand, his testimony would be based on hearsay,
and therefore, inadmissible. In Urga v. State,82 a doctor rendered an
opinion that an abortion had been attempted. His opinion was based on
a conversation between the defendant and the prosecuting witness, which
the latter related to the doctor. Since the opinion was based on hearsay,
it was inadmissible. However, it was held to be harmless error because
it was cumulative of what had already been said on the stand, and stand-
ing alone, it was not essential for conviction.
An expert who testifies as to the sanity of the defendant at the time
the crime was committed must not base his opinion strictly on hearsay.
78. 147 So.2d 359 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
79. Hardy v. Hayes-Boch Roofing Co., 152 So.2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
80. Id. at 498.
81. 139 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
82. 155 So.2d 719 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
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As was noted in a different context,' if a substantial part of a doctor's
opinion is derived from conversations with third parties not before the
cdurt, his testimony would be inadmissible. If the conversations with
third parties were merely incidental and had little influence on the
doctor's ultimate opinion, his testimony is not excludable on the ground
that it is hearsay. However, argument as to the weight to be given such
testimony will be permitted.84 Similarly, in Pinkney v. State8" a physician
examined two bodies to determine the times of death. At the time of his
examination he incorrectly believed that one of the bodies had been em-
balmed. This did not destroy the validity of his testimony regarding the
matter, for his opinion on the stand was based on later-adduced testimony
to the effect that no embalming had taken place at the time of his
examination.
A party may render the statements of another admissible against
himself by subsequently adopting them as his own. The court in Trimble
v. State86 found this exception to the hearsay rule to be applicable to a
situation in which the defendant expressly assented to certain portions
of an accomplice's confession. In holding this to be an adoptive admis-
sion of a party opponent, the court said:
where a codefendant [sic] or accomplice makes a confession and
its contents are brought to the defendant's attention (through
hearing it given or hearing it read) and the defendant states that
the facts contained therein are correct, the statement is admis-
sible because, to use the Supreme Court's words, "to this extent
it was his own statement. 87
Since it was held to be "his own statement," the rule that a confession
of a co-defendant or accomplice is not admissible in evidence against a
defendant was not applicable.
Evidence as to what a witness would have done had she read the
warning on a can of drain cleanser was considered to be too conjectural
in Drackett Prod. Co. v. Blue88 to have any evidentiary value. In at-
tempting to prove the defendant's negligence in failing to give sufficient
warning of the product's dangerous potential, such conjecture-since she
had not read the warning-did not involve the proof of a fact. Rather
it attempted to prove a state of mind which would be impossible for the
defendant to disprove.
In Corbett v. Berg,89 an index card from the files of the Industrial
83. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
84. Land v. State, 156 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1963).
85. 142 So.2d 144 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
86. 143 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
87. Id. at 332.
88. 152 So.2d 463 (Fla. 1963).
89. 152 So.2d 196 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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Commission fell within the "public record" exception to the hearsay rule.
The card was a record "kept by an authorized public officer as a con-
venient and appropriate mode of discharging the duties and functions of
his office." As such, the card constituted prima facie evidence of the fact
that it purported to show. In Hardy v. Hayes-Boch Roofing Co.,90 as
indicated previously, the court distinguished "hospital records" which
would be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule, from
"progress notes" and "consultation notes" which would be excluded on
the ground that they were not a part of "hospital records." In World
Ins. Co. v. Kincaid,9 a coroner's report indicating the cause of death
as suicide was admitted into evidence. Although the Florida Statutes
make the coroner's records "public records" and admissible as to the
facts stated therein, a statement in the report that death was caused by
suicide is not such a fact, as contemplated by the statute, but rather an
opinion. As such, it was deemed as improper as the opinion of another
witness to the effect that the insured met his death by accident and not
by suicide.
JUDICIAL NOTIcE
In the area of judicial notice, most of the cases merely dealt with the
problem immediately before them, i.e., whether the subject was one in
which judicial notice could properly be taken. A few cases dealt generally
with the concept of judicial notice, and with the subsequent effect of
taking or refusing to take judicial notice of a matter.
In Nielsen v. Carney Groves, Inc. 2 the question of the navigability
of a certain stream became a relevant issue. In considering whether
judicial notice should or should not have been taken, the appellate court
indicated that a matter judicially noticed must be of common and general
knowledge and authoritatively settled. A matter of common knowledge,
as opposed to an official record, means that it is taken as true without
the necessity of offering evidence; this'is so because it is assumed that
the fact is so notorious that it will not be disputed. However, if an op-
ponent believes that the matter is disputable, he should be given an
opportunity to present evidence to that effect; if his evidence raises a
genuine issue of material fact, the matter should not be judicially noticed
but, rather, should be left as a question for the jury. In Mobley v. State,93
a question arose as to the applicability of a rule of the Game and Fresh
Water Fish Commission. The rule was not offered into evidence, but
judicial notice was taken of the rule. Even though a statute authorized
the taking of judicial notice of the rule, the court held that for an orderly
dispensation of justice the defendant should have been "appraised, under
90. 152 So.2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
91. 145 So.2d 268 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
92. 159 So.2d 489 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
93. 143 So.2d 821 (Fla. 1962).
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the rules of procedure, of the regulation of which violation is alleged."
4
In Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. State,9
5 the court took judicial notice of
the fact that federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with state
courts over many judiciable matters within the geographical bounds of
the state. Thus, when the defendant was incarcerated by a federal court
and it therefore became impossible for him to appear in a state trial
court, this constituted an act of law which operated to exonerate the
bond posted for the defendant in the state court.
Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that a great deal of munici-
pal police action is initiated as the result of a complaint. Thus, in Kelly
v. State96 an attempted bribe to suppress complaints, although not directed
to strict "legal proceedings," nevertheless was covered by section 838.011
of the Florida Statutes, which defines bribery. The bribery statute speaks
of proceedings pending at law, but the court held that the attempted
suppression of complaints would no less short-circuit municipal action
and, therefore, was covered by the statute. In State v. Boggs,
97 it was al-
leged that a search warrant was issued on the basis of a false affidavit.
In reversing a finding of contempt, the court held that to find contempt
for false swearing, there must be judicial knowledge of the falsity,
and a mere belief or suspicion of falsity was insufficient.
In State Road Dept. v. Outlaw9 it was stated that the trial court
could not take judicial notice that a witness had the knowledge and skills
qualifying him to testify as an expert. As noted previously, the resulting
conclusion was to the effect that because of the great expense to which
the condemning authority may be placed, the qualification for testifying
as an expert would be somewhat relaxed in such instances.
9
DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
The failure to invoke specifically the dead man's statute did not con-
stitute a waiver of the protection which it affords when the record made
it reasonably clear that the statute was the basis for objecting to testi-
mony. Thus, in Schenkel v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank... there was held to be
no waiver since numerous objections were made to the testimony. The
court subsequently held that testimony of a nurse as to services rendered
to a decedent under an alleged oral contract upon which she was now
suing, was a "transaction" within the purview of the dead man's statute.
In Collins v. Farley, ° ' the question arose as to whether the dead
94. Id. at 823.
95. 140 So.2d 66 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1962).
96. 137 So.2d 608 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
97. 151 So.2d 456 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
98. 148 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
99. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
100. 141 So.2d 327 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1962).
101. 137 So.2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
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man's statute should preclude a party to an automobile accident, who is
now a party to a suit involving the collision, from testifying as to the
actions of the deceased driver just prior to the collision. The court noted
that the word "transaction" had been construed "to encompass every
variety of affairs which can form the subject of negotiation, interview or
actions between two persons," and therefore held that the driver's testi-
mony was barred by the statute. However, on certiorari to the supreme
court,1 closer scrutiny was made of the matter. After considerable dis-
cussion of the history, purpose and divergent constructions of the dead
man's statute, the court adhered to the view that a "transaction" requires
a "course of conduct or a mutuality of responsibility resulting from the
voluntary conduct of opposing parties." Thus, a "transaction" results
"when one enters upon a course of conduct after a knowing exchange of
reciprocal acts or conversations." The court therefore held that an auto-
mobile collision did not constitute a "transaction" as was contemplated
by the dead man's statute, and the survivor of such a collision was free
to testify as to his observations just prior to the accident. The court
stated that
the exclusion of such testimony will work greater injustices by
preventing recovery on legitimate claims as against the view that
admissibility might result in the establishment of fraudulent
claims against decedents' estates. 03
In Security Trust Co. v. Grant,'°4 the executor of the decedent's
estate was sued upon a demand note which provided for interest and
reasonable attorney's fees. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that a certain
attorney had been hired to file this s'uit, and he was to receive a reason-
able sum for his services, as the court may find. The plaintiff subsequently
discharged the attorney and hired new counsel. The first attorney was
then called as a witness for the purpose of relating an acknowledgement
by the deceased that the signature on the note was her own. The de-
fendant objected to his testimony on the ground that, because he was to
receive a "reasonable sum as the court finds," he was a party interested
in the event whose testimony would be barred by the dead man's statute.
The gist of the problem thus resolved itself into a consideration of the
type of fee that the attorney was to receive. The defendant contended
that, because he was to receive "reasonable fees as the court finds," his
fee would necessarily be based on the outcome of the case and thus would
be a contingency arrangement constituting a sufficient "interest" in the
case to disqualify the attorney's testimony. While the court conceded
this point to the defendant, it went on to state that, when an attorney's
representation of a client is terminated, his compensation is subsequently
102. Farley v. Collins, 146 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1962).
103. Id. at 370.
104. 155 So.2d 805 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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presumed to be on a quantum meruit basis. The court further held that,
even if this were not true, there is no presumption that the original con-
tingent fee arrangement survived the termination of the attorney-client
relationship. Since the attorney was presumably to be compensated. only
for the reasonable value of the service which he rendered for his client,
there was no evidence to indicate that the attorney had a disqualifying
"interest in the event" of the action.
ACCIDENT REPORTS
In Hancock v. McDonald,0 5 an action involving an automobile colli-
sion, the question arose as to whether the defendant was operating a
vehicle with the knowledge and consent of the son of the owner of the
vehicle. On the stand, the son denied giving the defendant permission, and
the plaintiff then called the investigating officer as a witness in an effort
to prove that the son previously had made an inconsistent statement
regarding such permission. The trial court excluded the testimony on the
basis of section 317.17 of the Florida Statutes, which regards all accident
reports made by persons involved in accidents as confidential information
not to be used in any trials. However, the appellate court pointed out
that the son was not at or near the scene of the collision and was not
required to make an accident report; also that there was no showing that
his statement was iused in the officer's accident report. Under these cir-
cumstances, the son was not a member of the class of "persons involved
in accidents" within the meaning of section 317.17, and consequently
his statement to the officer was not privileged.
COMMENT BY THE COURT
If a party wishes to object to comments made by the judge, he must
do so at the time of the alleged impropriety. Thus, in Collins v. Farley ° '
the defendant failed to preserve the point for appeal by failing to make
a timely objection to the remarks at the time of trial. In Crews v.
Warren, °7 the defendants contended that the trial judge participated in
the trial to such an extent as to prejudice the jury adversely to the de-
fendants. On appeal the court concluded that the questioning of a witness
by the judge in this particular instance was proper in that it was an
attempt to clarify certain vital facts within the apparent knowledge of the
witness to which he had given somwhat vague testimony. The defendants
further contended that, while the defendants' counsel was cross-exami-
nating a witness, the judge made prejudicial remarks to the effect that he
disliked repetitive testimony and matters which amounted to little or
nothing on cross-examination. The appellate court pointed out that it is
105. 148 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
106. 147 So.2d 593 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
107. 157 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
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confronted with nothing but the whole record, and that a trial judge is
in a peculiarly advantageous position to observe the nuances and impli-
cations of all that transpired. Thus, one who challenges the remarks or
actions of a trial judge
assumes the heavey burden ... of showing the commission of an
act that is inherently or under the peculiar circumstances of the
case clearly of a nature prejudicial to his rights. . . The act
complained of must be such as to produce a compelling infer-
ence that had it not occurred the jury would have returned a
verdict more favorable to the aggrieved party.'018
In view of the above test, the remarks complained of in the instant
case did not constitute a sufficient departure from the norm of acceptable
judicial conduct to result in any such probable, detrimental prejudice to
the defendants.
VIEw BY JURY
In Ace Cab Co. v. Garcia,0 9 an action involving an automobile colli-
sion, one of the jurors viewed the scene of the accident during the course
of the trial without court permission. Although this was misconduct on
the part of the juror, it was not the basis for a new trial unless it could
be shown that such a view was prejudicial. Since the record was devoid
of any showing that the unauthorized view operated to the prejudice of
the defendants, the contention was held to be without merit.
ADVERSE WITNESS RULE
When a plaintiff calls the defendant as an adverse witness under
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.37(a), he is not bound by the de-
fendant's testimony, nor is the plaintiff's prima facie case destroyed if
there exists on his behalf other conflicting testimony as well."' In P & N
Inv. Corp. v. Real" the court held that a person called as an adverse
witness pursuant to Rule 1.37(a) need not be declared as such. How-
ever, even without involving the rule, if an obviously adverse witness is
called, as was here the case, the plaintiff is not bound by his unfavorable
testimony unless the evidence otherwise fails to demonstrate a prima facie
case. The court reached its decision after quoting numerous authorities
to the effect that a party should be permitted to impeach his own witness,
but in the court's specific holding in this case, no such sweeping legal
pronouncement was made.
In Brookbank v. Matkieu"2 the court pointed out that Rule 1.37(a)
108. Id. at 561-62.
109. 140 So.2d 338 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
110. Busser v. Sabatasso, 143 So.2d 532 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
111. 153 So.2d 865 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
112. 152 So.2d 526 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
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states that an adverse party called as a witness "may be contradicted and
impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-
examined by the adverse party only upon the subject matter of his exami-
nation in chief." The reason for the rule, as announced by the court, was
to "extend to the adverse party the same right of cross-examination that
is extended to his opposite when a witness is called under the rule." Thus,
the trial court had erred in not allowing counsel to interrogate the de-
fendant by leading questions on cross-examination after he had been
called by the plaintiff as an adverse witness.
